Bureaucratic Structure And Bureaucratic Performance In Less Developed Countries Pdf
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- Civil service reform in developing countries
- Politics, Delegation, and Bureaucracy
- Governance, Administration and Development
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Civil service reform in developing countries
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Civil service reform is a deliberate action to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, professionalism, representativity and democratic character of a civil service , with a view to promoting better delivery of public goods and services, with increased accountability. Such actions can include data gathering and analysis, organizational restructuring , improving human resource management and training , enhancing pay and benefits while assuring sustainability under overall fiscal constraints, and strengthening measures for performance management , public participation , transparency , and combating corruption. The academic literature on civil service reform has provided arguments and counterarguments clarifying how several approaches to reform affect the overall performance of the civil service. The increasing availability of empirical data allows to test the effectiveness of specific reforms in a given context. While designing effective civil service reforms is a tremendously complex task considering that the right mix of corruption control and performance improvements may vary greatly across and within countries, empirical as well as qualitative research can contribute to the body of evidence-based knowledge on civil service reforms in developing countries.
This article contributes to the debate on environmental determinants of public service performance by analyzing the effect of country size population size on public service effectiveness. It theoretically describes and empirically tests a size-induced trade-off between economies and diseconomies of scale in national bureaucracies. The main argument is that public service performance increases with size due to economies of scale, but it decreases after the optimal country size when bureaucracies become too large and cumbersome to manage. The hypothesized curvilinear effect is tested for the first time empirically in cross-sectional regression models and multilevel within-between RE models that isolate the theoretically relevant between-country effect. The results support the expected inverse U-shaped relation on a global scale and in the subsample of democracies. The findings and their implication for research and practice are discussed: Public management must adapt theoretically and practically to country size as it is a contextual factor beyond the control of managers.
Politics, Delegation, and Bureaucracy
This article studies some of the recent models and associated empirical research on politics, delegation, and bureaucracy. It describes the four core theoretical arguments that constantly emerge from these models and the empirical tests that focus on patterns of delegation strategies. The article also reviews some of the recent theoretical models that are able to provide insights into the circumstances under which the logic of these theoretical arguments breaks down. Keywords: recent models , empirical research , politics , delegation , bureaucracy , theoretical arguments , delegation strategies. Modern democratic government cannot function without bureaucracy. Given the vast array of policy issues that come before government, the complexity of these issues, and the resources needed to address them, elected politicians have no choice but to delegate at least some responsibility over these issues to bureaucracies. Of course, once politicians delegate, they also face a potential loss of control over the issues that they have delegated.
Governance, Administration and Development
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The [Singapore] government believed that an efficient bureaucratic system is one in which the officers are well-paid so the temptation to resort to bribes would be reduced. The importance of adequate remuneration in ensuring an honest civil service is widely recognized in the policy debate. They assume that civil servants maximize expected income.